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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I 
The Trial Court erred in granting specific performance of 
the real estate contract because Plaintiff failed to perform 
a condition precedent found in the contract and because 
Plaintiff has not himself failed to discharge his obligations 
before seeking equitable relief. 
PQIN^ II 
Plaintiff, at the time of the execution of the purchase 
agreement had no authority from co-tenants to sell the 
property, and, therefore, the contract was invalid. 
POIN^ III 
The parties, by their conduct, established 
a relationship as joint venturers. 
STATEMENT OF THE CA^E 
A) Nature of the Case. This is an action by Plaintiffs 
upon a contract to purchase real property. The Plaintiffs seek 
damages, costs, attorney's fees and specific performance. The 
Defendants deny Plaintiffs1 allegations and prayer for relief and 
allege affirmatively among other things that the Plaintiffs did 
not have the authority to enter into the agreement, and both par-
ties failed to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement 
Plaintiff seeks to enforce, when in fact the parties treated the 
real estate development as a joint venture. 
B) Course of Proceedings. The matter was tried before the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen without a jury. 
C) Disposition in the Trial Court. The ^rial Court ruled as 
follows: 
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(1) That the contract between the parties was binding 
and enforceable. 
(2) The balance due on the contract was $149,500. 
(3) Any possible defect in title or the ability of 
Plaintiff, Mark McCracken to convey title because of defec-
tive power-of-attorney was cured by the execution, delivery 
of a warranty deed recorded 6 years after the date of the 
agreement. 
(4) That Defendants were required to execute a past due 
promissory note and a trust deed to secure the promissory 
note as provided in the agreement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mark McCracken and the Defendants were acquaintances prior to 
the entry into the agreement which is the subject of this litiga-
tion and had had some prior business dealings with each other. 
(TR 42) The parties commenced negotiations with each other con-
cerning the property approximately six months prior to the date of 
the agreement. Although Plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence 
showing their title to the property, (TR 35 lines 16 - 20, TR 36 
lines 2 - 11) Exhibit 1 recites that the owners of the property 
are Mark McCracken, Doris McCracken and Kedrick and Lila P. 
McCracken, and Exhibit 6 indicates that Kedrick McCracken and Lila 
P. McCracken each own an undivided one-fourth interest in the pro-
perty. 
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Utah, to draw the 
On the 13th day of July, 1978, Kedrictk McCracken and Lila P. 
McCracken conveyed their interest in the subject property to them-
selves in trust as "trustees" of the Kedrick McCracken Family 
Revocable Trust, The deed was recorded ih Cache County on July 
13, 1978. (See Ex. 6) (TR 15 line 18 - $5 sets forth the 
interest of Plaintiffs) 
Plaintiff, Mark McCracken and Defendants by agreement 
selected Attorney Scott Barrett of Logan, 
agreement between the parties. (Ex. 1) (^ R 20) Each party paid 
one-half of the attorney's fee. (TR 20) the parties testified 
that they each contributed to the provisions incorporated in the 
agreement. (TR 41) Mark McCracken indicated that he and Jerry 
Downs on separate occasions made changes to the agreement. (TR 
41) McCracken read and understood the terms of the agreement. (TR 
42) Further, Mark McCracken testified at TR page 42 as follows: 
Q. And that each of the conditions that were contained 
in the contract were agreed to in the office and 
discussed between all of you? 
A. Yes. 
Jerry Downs essentially confirms this testimony. (TR 72) 
The agreement was prepared in draft form by Attorney Scott Barrett 
of Logan, Utah. (TR 12) However, it was not signed in his pre-
sence and he was unaware that the agreement had been signed or 
recorded. (TR 115) 
After conveying their undivided one-palf interest to them-
selves as trustees, Kedrick and Lila P. MbCracken, as individuals, 
made and executed a special power of attorney to Mark McCracken 
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purportedly for the purpose of allowing him to sell their pro-
perty. The contract was executed on the 19th day of October, 1978 
by Mark McCracken in behalf of himself and as an attorney for 
Kedrick McCracken, Lila P. McCracken individually and Doris E. 
McCracken. 
The contract provided as follows: (See a copy attached as an 
addendum hereto.) 
1. A representation that Mark McCracken was the owner of the 
property. 
2. That the seller agreed to sell the property with a nomi-
nal downpayment of $500.00 and the balance to be paid in the form 
of a note secured by a deed of trust payable in full on the 1st of 
September, 1983. 
3. Buyers shall be the developers and sub-dividers and the 
sellers shall have no part in nor control over the sub-division or 
sale of the lots. 
4. Closing of this agreement by the sellers deeding the sub-
ject property to the buyers and buyers delivering their note and 
deed of trust to the sellers shall be on or before November 20, 
1978 at the sole election of sellers. (Emphasis ours) 
5. Buyers shall pay all sub-division costs. 
6. Sellers agree to provide buyers with a policy of title 
insurance within ninety (90) days after the execution of the 
agreement. 
7. The agreement constituted the entire agreement of the 
parties. (See addendum attached hereto.) 
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The agreement was recorded on the day it is dated October 19, 
1978, in the office of the Recorder of Cache County, Utah. 
On the date specified for closing (November 20, 1 978) sellers 
failed to make an election to proceed withj the contract and failed 
to deed the property to buyers. Buyers in turn failed to execute 
a note and trust deed to secure the balance due, (Mark 
Mccracken's testimony TR 31, 32, 43) (Jerry Downs' testimony TR 
85, 103, 18) (Scott Barrett's testimony TR 115, 118) Attorney 
Scott Barrett testified upon cross examination that he was never 
asked to nor did he prepare a deed to Greaves and Downs (TR 114), 
a promissory note or a trust deed (TR 114), nor did he receive 
from any of the parties an election that they wanted to proceed 
with the agreement. (TR 115) Barrett further testified that 
nothing in his file indicated that a policy of title insurance was 
ever ordered. 
Barrett concedes that the transaction was never completed (TR 
14) and that the parties thereafter operated under an arrangement 
different from the terms and conditions of the contract. (TR 118) 
The parties sub-divided the property, I not as seller and 
purchaser, but as joint participants in the management of the ven-
ture. (See Ex. 4) Mark McCracken executed the owner's dedication 
for himself, his mother Doris McCracken and his aunt and uncle, 
Kedrick McCracken and Lila McCracken. The improvements were made 
to the property by Greaves and Downs at their expense. 
The first sub-divided lot was sold by the parties on the 21st 
day of August, 1980. (Ex. 8) By reason of the fact that the 
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property had not been deeded to Greaves and Downs, all parties 
jointly executed a warranty deed to purchaser Progressive Homes, 
Mark McCracken signed for himself and as an attorney-in-fact for 
his mother Doris and as an attorney-in-fact for Kedrick and Lila 
McCracken individually and as trustees. 
On the 19th day of September three more lots were sold to 
Progressive Homes with Cecil Mark McCracken signing the deeds, for 
himself and as an attorney-in-fact for Doris McCracken, Kedrick 
McCracken and Lila P. McCracken. No mention was made of the 
status of Kedrick and Lila McCracken as trustees. (Although 
marketable title was not conveyed, no one questioned the fact.) 
Checks in payment of the lots were made by Progressive Homes 
paying one-half to Cecil Mark McCracken directly and one-half to 
Greaves and Downs directly. (See Ex. 9 and 10) Upon cross exami-
nation Mark McCracken testified as follows: 
Q. You just received the money didn't you? 
A. I received the money. But I gave the lots for the 
money. 
McCracken further testified on direct examination from his 
counsel as follows: 
Q. What if anything did you do with respect to the sale 
of the lots? 
A. I signed some papers to release the lots. 
Q. Who presented these papers to you? 
A. Jerry Downs. 
Q. And, why did you do that? 
A. So they could release the lots to sell them... had 
to be done to sell the lots. 
Q. Did you obtain any benefit from that? 
A. One-half of the sale of the lots that were sold. 
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On January 15, 1981, the Plaintiff Mark McCracken and the 
Defendants went into the office of Attorney Scott Barrett. 
Exactly which parties went in was not agreed upon by all parties 
at the trial. However, a note dated January 16, 1981r in Scott 
Barrett's office indicates that the purchase agreement was picked 
up in draft form and signed and recorded. (See Plaintiff's Ex. 11) 
Attorney Barrett testified and Exhibit 11 confirms his testimony 
and reveals that the transaction was never completed. 
(Mccracken's testimony TR 31, 32, 43; Jerry Downs1 testimony TR 
85; Barrett's testimony TR 114, 115, 118) 
Attorney Barrett explained to Use parties that if Exhibit 1 
was to be treated as a purchase sai --•*•- t there should be ai I 
escrow account set up. The parties present stated to Attorney 
Barrett that they "preferred to leave the bituation as it was and 
not have deeds exchange hands at that time and that whenever a lot 
was sold that the parties would all have to sign so there was no 
problem passing title in that way". (Third paragraph Ex. 11) 
McCracken confirms this testimony at TR page 62. 
There were no further sales of lots from this tract of ground 
after January 15, 1981. 
On April 23, 1984, 5% years after the agreement was signed 
Kedrick McCracken, Lila McCracken and Doris E. McCracken conveyed 
their interest in the property to Mark Cecil McCracken by special 
warranty deed. (See Ex. 7) 
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The property described in the contract which was not sub-
divided was either farmed by Mark McCracken or was leased to 
another farmer by Mark McCracken. (TR 32) He retained all pro-
fits from the farming operations and paid the water taxes. 
(TR 57) 
The purchase agreement in paragraph 1 provides that upon the 
closing of the sale and McCracken deeding the property to the 
buyers, buyers were to deliver their note and mortgage to 
McCrackens. However, McCracken at page 33 of the transcript 
testifies as follows: 
Q. Have you been at all times ready and able to deliver 
clear title to Messrs. Greaves and Downs upon payment 
of the remaining $149,500.00? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you are capable of doing that even now? 
A. Yes. 
At a post-judgment hearing to require the Defendants to exe-
cute a note and trust deed evidence was presented to the effect 
that McCracken had assigned his interest to Zions1 First National 
Bank on the 10th day of March, 1982, and further had executed a 
trust deed encumbering the subject property in the amount of 
$92,525.00 on the 27th day of March, 1984. (Ex. 13, 14) 
The decree of the Trial Court entered on the 12th day of 
November, 1985, required the Defendants to execute a trust deed 
and mortgage that was due and payable on the 1st day of September, 
1983, to enable Plaintiffs to have the foreclosure remedies pro-
vided by law. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTSJ 
Point I. 
1. The agreement entered into between the parties in 1978 
contains a condition precedent which was never fulfilled by the 
Plaintiff who now seeks specific performanbe. 
2. p] ai ntlff has failed to discharge his own obligations 
under the contract and did not come into the Court having himself 
done equity. 
3. Plaintiffs1 acts in mortgaging the property are incon-
sistent with his present claim of specific performance. 
The Plaintiffs1 5% year delay in the commencement of 
this acti' - -..: . • si time there has been an approximate 50% 
devaluation in the land bars Plaintiff from seeking specific per-
formance constitutes latches. 
Point II. 
Mark McCracken attempted to negotiate the contract for him-
self and three other persons. An undivided one-half of the 
interest in the property was held in a family trust agreement. 
The trustees of a trust cannot delegate the discretion vested in 
them to another person, and, therefore, Mayk McCracken had no 
authority > represent all parties in the contract negotiations. 
Point III. 
The parties, by their conduct, *' •• -?n^  * -* -^"H4-- ^hip as 
joint venturers and as such the termination of the joint venture 
by the parties leaves each party with the ownership of the pro-
perty they had prior to the venture and each having made a profit 
from the venture. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
A. The contract contained a condition precedent to be per-
formed by McCrackens prior to seeking performance by Defendants. 
Paragraph 3 of the agreement states as follows: 
"The closing.of this agreement by sellers deeding the sub-
ject property to the buyers and buyers delivering their 
note and trust deed to the sellers shall be on or before 
November 20, 1978 at the sole election of the sellers." 
The contract was dated and recorded on the 19th day of 
October, 1978. 
All parties1 indicated that on the closing date of November 
20, 1978, the seller McCracken made no election to proceed with 
the agreement. (See Mccracken's Testimony TR 31, 32, and 46) 
Therefore, the express condition precedent found in the 
contract was never fulfilled by the Plaintiff. The Trial Court in 
its findings found in paragraph 3 as follows: 
"Although the contract requires that a note and trust 
deed would be executed by the buyers evidencing and 
securing the remaining unpaid balance due under the 
contract, no such note or trust deed was ever executed 
or delivered to plaintiffs and consequently no warranty 
deed was executed and delivered to the defendants conveying 
the property." 
It is apparent that the Trial Court in viewing the matter 
found that the burden was upon the Defendants, Greaves and Downs 
to tender a note and trust deed, rather than following the clear 
import of the paragraph which states that the seller, McCracken 
shall have the sole election as to whether or not to proceed with 
the agreement. 
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On January 15, 1981, the Plaintiff an<^  one or more of the 
Defendants met in Attorney Barrett's Offict. Attorney Barrett 
advised the Defendants that if they were to have a binding sales 
agreement the agreement should be placed iiji escrow with a deed 
from McCracken to Greaves and Downs. 
The parties stated that they preferred to leave the situation 
as it was and not exchange deeds yet and tfliat upon the sale of any 
lot all parties were to convey the property. (See Ex. 11 and TR 
116 - 118) 
The testimony of the parties never attempted to vary the 
terms of the contract, and, therefore, thejcontract is not ambi-
guous. It is further evident from the testimony of the parties 
that Plaintiff was never willing to convey | the property in order 
to get performance of the contract. Plaintiff, therefore, failed 
to tender performance under the condition precedent of the 
agreement and the agreement is therefore unenforceable. 
In Kimball v. Campbell, Utah, 699 P.2c^  714, (1985), this 
Court held that a contracts interpretation 
where no extrinsic evidence of intent is introduced. By reason of 
the fact that the contract's interpretation is a question of law, 
this Court may review the Trial Court's action under a correctness 
standard. See Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., Utah, 603 
P.2d 803 (1974). 
A review of paragraph 3 of the agreemejnt shows that the 
seller, McCracken had the sole election givjen to him to proceed 
with the agreement. Having never made that! election in writing or 
is a question of law 
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by tendering a deed it is obvious that McCracken failed to perform 
the condition precedent. We must ask ourselves whether or not 
Defendants had a right to specific performance absent an election 
by the Plaintiff to proceed with the sale. 
In Baxter v. Camelot Properties, Utah, 622 P.2d 808, (1981), 
this Court upheld the Trial Court's judgment denying Plaintiff 
specific performance allowing her to purchase a condominium unit 
by reason of the fact that Baxter failed to perform as required by 
the terms of her agreement. See also Huck v. Hayes, Utah 560 P.2d 
1142, (1977), where this Court held that: 
(I)t is fundamental that a party to a contract should 
obtain no advantage from the fact that he is himself 
unable to perform. Since the defendant has not come 
forth with the agreed title insurance policy demon-
strating that he could convey a clear and marketable 
title asof the proposed closing date, March 8, 1974, 
he could neither demand payment by the plaintiff on 
that date, nor claim that the latter was in default 
for failing to make the payment. 
See also Kiahtipes v. Mills, Utah, 649 P.2d 9 (1982). Branstetter 
v. Cox, Kansas, 496 P.2d 1345 (1972) and Bird v. Casa Royal West, 
Nevada, 624 P.2d 17 (1981) and Rubber, Inc. v. Jenkins, Colorado, 
570 P.2d 1317 (1977). 
McCracken testified that he did not rely on anyone else to 
complete the sale (TR 31), and, therefore, he is responsible for 
his compliance with the terms and agreements of the contract. 
B. Further, the Plaintiff is not entitled to specific per-
formance because he has failed to discharge his own obligations. 
Plaintiff brought this action, not upon the promissory note 
and mortgage contemplated by the agreement, but upon his original 
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agreement which is an agreement to make a promissory note and 
mortgage upon his performance by delivering a deed at the time of 
the execution of the contract. He admits reading the contract and 
knowing its contents and further admits t^ hat he was capable of 
delivering a deed and title insurance but 
further with the contract. (TR 42, 43, 46)1 
When asked in January of 1981 by Attqi rney Barrett if he 
wished to complete the contract as contemplated he indicated that 
he did not wish to convey the property at 
operate as they were doing on an informal 
The Plaintiff commenced this action seeking the equitable 
he failed to proceed 
that time but wished to 
basis. 
remedy of specific performance. However, 
discharge his own obligations prior to seel 
As indicated in paragraph A above the 
make the election under paragraph 3 to clo 
Further, Plaintiff failed to draw or have 
Plaintiff had failed to 
king such relief. 
Plaintiff had failed to 
se the agreement, 
drawn the appropriate 
on. (TR 33, 46) In 
the Defendant violated 
deeds, mortgages to complete the transacti 
addition thereto the subsequent conduct of| 
paragraph 2 in retaining control over the subdivision and sale of 
the lots. (TR 24, 25, 52, 54) The Plaintiff also violated 
paragraph 6 of the agreement in failing tol provide a policy of 
title insurance within 90 days after the execution of the 
agreement or at any other time. The fact of the matter is that 
the Plaintiff, after executing the contract of sale, encumbered 
the property to Zions First National Bank thereby making it 
impossible for clear title to pass to the Pefendant. See Fischer 
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v. Johnson, Utah, 525 P.2d 45 (1974), Creer v. Thurman, Utah, 581 
P.2d 149 (1978). 
Each of these acts on the part of the Plaintiff is contrary 
to Plaintiff's obligation to discharge his obligations under the 
agreement. 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint seeks a money judgment and for declar-
tory relief requiring the Defendants to execute a note and trust 
deed to thereafter be foreclosed. The Trial Court concluded in 
December of 1985 that the contract was a binding contract and 
ordered the Defendants to execute a promissory note and trust deed 
with a due date of September 1, 1983, so that the same might be 
enforced by a Plaintiff, who prior to that time had failed to per-
form the agreement himself. 
In Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, Utah, 621 P.2d 1240, (1980), 
this Court held that where a remedy is sought in equity, as a pre-
dicate to equitable relief "a party must exercise reasonable 
efforts to discharge his own obligations." Also Reed v. Alvey, 
Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980). Wall Street Porperties v. Gossner, 
Oregon, 632 P.2d 1310 (1981). 
Only after it was apparent that a severe devaluation in the 
property had occurred did the Defendant attempt to enforce the 
agreement. His performance at that time consisted of filing a 
complaint. He failed, even then, to tender a deed and title 
insurance. 
C. Acts of Plaintiff are not consistent with the performance 
of the agreement. Mark McCracken attempted to assign his interest 
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is inconsistent with 
in Exhibit 1 to Zions First National Bank 6n the 10th day of 
March, 1982, (See Ex. 13) and thereafter made a trust deed encum-
bering the land in question for the sum of $92,525.00 on the 27th 
day of April, 1984. (Ex. 14) (Ex. 13, 14 yere introduced at a 
post judgment hearing to require executingjthe note and trust deed 
by Defendants) 
The act of attempting to assign the contract is inconsistent 
with his representation that he has the ability to convey good 
title. The act of mortgaging the property 
his ability to give free and clear title, as shown by the policy 
of title insurance he was obligated to deliver. Each of these 
acts is consistent with his intention to retain title, ownership 
and control of the property as manifested j^n the office of 
Attorney Barrett. Each of these acts is a repudiation of the 
agreement and an act which bars Plaintiff flrom performance of the 
contract. These acts induced these Defendants into taking a posi-
tion which is inconsistent with the Plaintijff's present claims. 
Fischer v. Johnson, Supra. 
D. The contract is unenforceable by reason of the fact that 
the Plaintiff has delayed enforcement of the agreement to the 
disadvantage of the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff admits that he made no election to proceed with 
the contract and that the deed, notes and mortgages were not 
exchanged between the parties. He further concedes that he has 
retained the control over the property by taking the crops off the 
property and/or leasing it out for his personal gain. The 
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Plaintiff commenced this action in April of 1984 when almost six 
years after he had failed to elect to proceed and tender a deed 
and three years after the meeting in Attorney Barrett's Office 
where he represented to Attorney Barrett that he did not wish to 
tender a deed but wanted to "leave the situation the way it is and 
not have any deeds exchange hands yet". The decision of the Trial 
Court in ordering specific performance raises the issue as to 
whether or not the Plaintiff can delay his performance for a 
period of six years, all the while watching the property decline 
in value to the disadvantage of the purchasers. This action ws 
brought after the note and mortgage would have been payable had 
such documents been executed. Had the Plaintiff brought this 
action within a reason-able period of time the Defendants could 
have complied with the agreement earlier to protect themselves. 
It is the Plaintiff's position that the Trial Court's 
judgment in enforcing the agreement after a delay of six years 
constitutes error. 
See the case of Papanikolas Brothers Ent. v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center, Utah, 535 P.2d 1256, (1975), where the court said 
as follows: 
"Latches is not mere delay but delay that works advantage 
to another. To constitute latches two elements must be 
established: (1) lack of diligence on the part of the 
plaintiff, and (2) an injury to the defendant owing to 
such lack of diligence. Although lapse of time is an 
essential part of latches, the length of time must depend 
upon the circumstances of each case for the propriety of 
refusing a claim as equally predicated upon the gravity 
of the prejudice suffered by the defendant and the length 
of plaintiff's delay." 
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Since 1981 the property has devalued substantially as subdivision 
property and the ability to sell the lots for a profit has been 
reduced by the presence of a substantial recession. If the 
building boom had continued Plaintiff would have been able to 
maintain control of his land, farm the uncjevelopment portion and 
reaped a profit from the sale of lots. 
However, upon the advent of the business recession the 
Plaintiff realized that his prospect of profit through the sale of 
lots was diminishing and that his continued ownership of the pro-
perty was not making a profit as anticipated. He, thereafter, in 
1982 and 1984 purportedly assigned his interest in the agreement 
and mortgaged the property to secure the payment of other indebt-
edness. (See Ex. 13 and 14) The last trust deed was dated the 
27th day of March, 1984 and recorded on Aplril 27, 1984, 3 days 
prior to the commencement of this action seeking specific perfor-
mance. The judgment of the Trial Court requires Defendants to 
make and execute a note and trust deed two years delinquent. 
Defendants are forced into immediate nonjudicial foreclosure pro-
ceedings for the foreclosure of the trust deed and another suit 
because Plaintiff failed to give marketable title to Defendants. 
Plaintiff presently enjoys the benefit of a six-year-old bargain 
in a declining economy. The Plaintiff by virtue of the Trial 
Court's judgment is given a "peek into the future" to select his 
remedy regardless of whether or not his cqnduct is inconsistent or 
consistent with that remedy. The Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah in the case of Mawhinney v. Jensen, 1J20 Utah, 142, 232 P. 2d 
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769, (1951), held that a delay will bar equitable relief in a suit 
for rescission. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF, AT THE TIxME OF THE EXECUTION OF THE PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT HAD NO AUTHORITY FROM CO-TENANTS TO SELL THE 
PROPERTY, AND, THEREFORE, THE CONTRACT WAS INVALID. 
On October 19, 1978, title to the subject property was vested 
as follows: One quarter, Mark McCracken; one quarter, Doris E. 
McCracken; one-half, Kedrick McCracken and Lila P. McCracken as 
trustees of the Kedrick McCracken Family Revocable Trust. 
Mark McCracken claims to have acted as an agent for his aunt 
and uncle to sell the property. (TR 17) 
He possessed a power-of-attorney executed by Kedrick 
McCracken and Lila P. McCracken as individuals but not as 
trustees. (See Ex. 2) Deeds for subdivided lots were signed by 
Mark McCracken sometimes recognizing the trust relationship of 
Kedrick and Lila P. McCracken and sometimes failing to recognize 
the trust relationship of Kedrick and Lila P. McCracken. (See 
Ex. 8) Clear title was not passed to the owners of the lots by 
virtue of these title defects. Jennings v. Murdock, Infra. On 
the 22nd day of April, 1984, approximately 8 days prior to the 
commencement of this action Kedrick McCracken and Lila P. 
McCracken, individually and as trustees of the Kedrick McCracken 
Family Revocable Trust executed a warranty deed conveying the pro-
perty to Mark McCracken. (Note, Mark McCracken encumbered the 
property to a bank 5 days later.) It is suggested that the real 
purpose of the deed was to provide a marketable title to facili-
tate the loan. 
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See Restatement of Trusts, Section 171 2d Note G. Also see 
Jennings v. Murdock, Kansas, 553 P.2d 846, (1976), where that 
court set forth the generally accepted rule as follows: 
"Generally speaking, the duty to administer a trust and 
to exercise the discretion vested in him rests from the 
trustee and cannot be delegated by hiiti to others." 
If the trustees could not delegate their authority to sell 
the property they could not execute a poweif-of-attorney as 
trustees. The power-of-attorney executed !f>y them as individuals 
is of no force and effect by reason of the fact that the property 
was held in trust. Therefore, the recitation in paragraph 1 of 
the agreement that the sellers were the owners of the real pro-
perty was false. McCracken further represented in paragraph 1 
that the sellers agreed to sell all of the property described in 
Exhibit "A" thus creating a second condition precedent of the sale 
that all parties agree to the sale. See Bifanstetter v. Cox, 
Infra, where the court held that the husband's signature was a 
condition precedent to the contract taking effect. 
By the very terms of this agreement to sell "all" of the pro-
erty the valid execution by "all" of the cfwners is a condition 
precedent which has not been met. The subsequent warranty deed 
five years later does not fulfill the condition. (See Point 1(C)) 
POINT III 
THE PARTIES, BY THEIR CONDUCT, ESTABLISHED 
A RELATIONSHIP AS JOINT VE^URERS. 
The evidence in this case shows that the parties elected to 
proceed to subdivide the property in the form of a joint venture 
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the terms of which are evidenced by the actions of the parties. 
Attorney Barrett, in his memorandum indicates very clearly that 
the parties elected not to proceed on the original agreement by 
implementing its terms but elected to "leave the situation as it 
is and not have any deeds exchange hands yet. "Whenever they sell 
a lot McCracken and Greaves and Downs all sign so there is no 
problem passing title in that way". Bassett v. Baker, Utah, 530 
P.2d 1 (1974), defines the elements of a joint venture. 
Contrary to the real estate agreement the parties mutually 
subdivided the land with McCracken retaining an ownership interest 
and control over the property so subdivided as evidenced by the 
dedication plat. (See Ex. 4) For this Court to reach the conclu-
sion that the parties acted in a joint venture is not unreasonable 
nor detrimental to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff has received his 
share of the lots that were sold (TR 25), has retained the 
ownership of the land for the purpose of taking crops from the 
land and/or leasing the land to others for monetary gain. He pre-
sently benefits by the zoning of the property, engineering and the 
development that is presently in place. (TR 118) Therefore, a 
finding by this court of a joint venture places each party in the 
proximate position they were in prior to the entry into the 
contract with each party having profited insofar as the land was 
sold and the profits divided. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the many cases before this Court relative to a 
specific performance reveals that in periods of economic 
-22-
prosperity, purchasers bring the actions ^or specific performance. 
In periods of a decline in the economy sellers bring the action. 
In prosperity the seller retains the benefit of his bargain and 
the purchaser may be entitled to the gain, in periods of a 
fit of his bargain at 
r period of time a 
declining market the seller wants the benei 
the expense of the purchasers. The greatei 
seller in a declining market delays the commencement of the action 
the greater the potential losses suffered by the buyer. In this 
action the seller has waited until the market value is approxima-
tely 50% of its prior value, as evidenced by the fact that the 
Plaintiffs' mortgage on the property in 1984 was $92,525.00 and he 
acknowledges a value of only $75,000 to $78,000.00 at the date of 
trial. (TR 65) 
The Findings of Fact by the Court are not supported by the 
evidence and the Conclusions of Law are clearly erroneous. ^he 
Trial Court's judgment grants to the Plaintiff the right to have 
his note and trust deed executed pursuant to the terms of a 
contract he has refused to abide by, and was unwilling to perform. 
The Plaintiff, by virtue of the Trial Court's decision, has 
been given the unique opportunity of delaying his performance 
under the agreement until the economic climate forecasts his best 
option and then allowing the Plaintiff to benefit at the expense 
of Defendants. These Defendants, for the foregoing reasons, 
request a reversal by this Court in accordance with the facts 
introduced at the Trial Court and the laws of this State and a 
finding of no cause of action upon Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ' ^ day of March, 1986. 
^ 
By 
HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE & CHAMBERS 
George W. Preston 
Attorney for Defendants & Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the above and 
foregoing DEFENDANTS' AND APPELLANTS' BRIEF to JAMES C. JENKINS & 
ASSOCIATES, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, at 67 East 100 
North, P. 0. Box 3700, Logan, Utah 84321 on this /'"""day of March, 
1986. 
•SMA 
George W. Preston 
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gxtu'liST /i I ////t/r*i 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
.uil 
-,/x. THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this /£-Jl day of IA 
October, 1978, by and between JERRY DOWNS and JERALD GREAVES, 
hereinafter referred to as Purchasers and MARK McCRACKEK, on be-
half of himself and as attorney in fact for KEDH|ICK McCRACKEN and 
LILA P. KcCRACKEN, husband and wife, and DORIS Ei. K C C R A C K E N , here-
inafter collectively referred to as Sellers, is hade with reference 
to the following fc.cts: 
WHEREAS, Selltrs are the owners of certain heal property in the 
City of Srr.ithfield, County of Cache, State of Ut^h, consisting of 
9.57 acres, more or- less, a more particular description of which 
is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A", and 
WHEREAS, Buyers are desirous of purchasing said property for 
envelopment and subdivision and Sellers are a^ree^able to selling the 
N O W , THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Sellers agree to sell and Buyers agree to purchase all 
of the property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, ccr.s 1st :r.<: 
-•f 9.57 acres more or less, in the City of S-.i thfji el d, County of 
Cache, State of Utah, and Buyers agree to pay for| said described 
property the amounts, in installments as follows:! 
a. As a ilownpayment, Buyers agree to rky to Sellers cor.-
te-.perarieous with the execution of this Agre^rivrnt , the rum ;'f 
Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), receipt of which is acknowledjed 
by the Sellers. 
b. Buyers agree to pay an additional Orje Hundred Seventy-
nine Thou::;.nd, Five Hundred Dollars (1179,500.00) in the Corn 
of aiNote secured by a Deed of Trust] on the described property. 
S^id Note shall be payable in full on the First of Sept^-.ber, 19 S 3, 
Provided, however, th.it, whenever Buyers shaljl sell a lot or 
portion of the described property, they shall pay cr.o-h.^lf cf 
the gross f\le pri^e less real estate commissions, if cr.y, cf 
CHASE AGREEKKKT 
age Two 
said lot to Sellers to apply on said Note. 
"~ c. Provided, further, that Buyers and Seller, agree 
that the Buyers are preparing a preliminary plat for subdi-
vision which will subdivide the property into twenty-seven (27) 
lots and that buyers will- sell said lots at the best available 
price. If, after all o*" the lots hBv-- been sold, more than a 
gross sales price of Three Hundred and Sixty Thousand dollars 
($360,000.00), less any real estate commissions, has been realized 
by the Buyers, then Sellers shall receive as additional compensa-
tion for the purchase and sale of their property, one-half (1/2) 
of all of the proceeds from the sale of said lots exceeding 
$360,000.00. 
2. It i3 further understood and agreed that the Buyers 
shall be the developers and subdividers and that Sellers sh3ll have 
no part in nor control over the subdivision or sale of the said 
lots. 
3. Closing of thin Agreement by Sellers deeding the 
subject property to the Buyers and Buyers delivering their Note 
and Deed of Trust to the Sellers shall be on or before November 20, 
1978, at the sole election of the Sellers. 
*J. It is agreed that this entire Agreement ic contingent 
upon approval of a final plat of subdivision being approved by the 
City of £.7:i thf ield. In the event said plat is not approved Cor iny 
reason within one year from the date of this Agreement, then the 
Buyers, at their option, may recind the agreement by deeding the 
described property back to the Sellers in return for the Pro.T.i ssrry 
\'cte. In s-jeh event, the Sellers shall retain the Five 'iundrr-d r»o!l:-.r 
(£500.00) downpayment. 
5. It is understood and agreed that Buyers shall pay 
all subdivision and development costs, including real estate tax.-s 
after the calendar year 1978. Sellers shall pay the 1973 real 
property taxes assessed against the subject property. 
. 6 .
 w Sel lers a/;re 3 to provide to Buyers a policy of title 
. i.r.-suranqe"'}: :.,!£*;• lie.-/?;; ,i,tr>:pc-nr.e within ninety (00) days .ifier the 
»y>.:p<-' 
J'ASE AGKEEKENT 
ire Three 
execution of this Agreement. 
" ' 7. As Buyers sell any lot or lots, the Seller agrees to 
execute and deliver to the designated title company a reconveyance 
from the Deed of Trust on any such lots, releasing said lots from the 
lien of the Deed of Trust. 
8. This Agreement constitutes-the entire agreement of 
the parties hereto and no amendments or changes i$ay be made except 
in writing, executed by the party to be charged. 
9. This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, exec-
utors, successors and assigns of the parties herejto, 
DATED this /y^' day of M'7>/^-^ 1J978. 
SUYEF.S: 
S JzrryDowns 
a • 
Jc-rald Greaves 
/ 
-ULr^TrCril-r-
SELLERS: 
-?& f<£ & t Mark McCracken 
On behalf of himself and as 
Attorney in Fact for: 
Kedrick McCracken and 
Lila P. McCracken, husband 
and wife, and 
Doris E. HeCracken 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s. 
County of Cache) 
On this _Jj_l-_ day of Oc£ak<r , 1978, personally appeared 
before me JERRY DOWNS, JERALD GREAVES and MARK McC^:AKEK', the 
signers of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
that they executed the same. 
' • ^ 'o ta ry Public 
Commission expires: />Uy /^ /fzz 
Fosiding in / ^ a >/
 j Cucla &«><l*f > lo'J^ 
James C. Jenkins 
JAMES C. JENKINS & ASSOCIATES 
67 East 100 North 
P.O. Box 3700 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-4107 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
MARK MCCRACKEN, KENDRICK 
MCCRACKEN, LILA P. MCCRACKEN 
and DORIS E. McCRACKEN 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JERRY DOtft'S and JERALD 
GREAVES 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 22759 
This matter having been heretofore tri^d before the honorable 
VeNoy Christoffersen, in the above-entitled court without jury 
on July 8, 1985, and pursuant to request of the Court the parties 
having filed their respective trial briefs and the court having 
received the same and also having heard oral arguments of counsel 
for the parties on the 26th day of September, 1985 and the court 
after oral arguments having rendered its final findings of fact 
and conclusions of law does hereby reduce the same to writing. 
1. This action involves real property located in 
Smithfield, Cache County, Utah as described in Plaintiff's 
Complaint and a contract for the sale and purchase of said 
property between the Plaintiffs and Defendants. 
2. Pursuant to negotiations initiated by Defendants, 
Plaintiffs on or about October 19, 1978, ex lecuted that certain 
- 7 C 6 Purchase Agreement of even date and admit ted in to evidence 
1 tu - IJ(L !.-.U fi 
trial. 
3. Under the contract the sum of $500.00 was paid to 
Plaintiffs by Defendants as a down payment and over a period of 
time an additional $29,500.00 was paid, leaving an outstanding 
balance (as of the last payment made in September of 1980) of 
$149,500.00. Although the contract requires that a note and 
trust deed be executed by the Defendant Buyers evidencing and 
securing the remaining unpaid balance due under the contract, no 
such note or trust deed was ever executed or delivered to 
Plaintiffs and consequently no Warranty Deed was executed and 
delivered to the Defendants conveying the property. 
4. The contract further provided that Defendants would pay 
all subdivision and development costs including real estate taxes 
after the calendar year 1978. The contract further provided that 
the Promissory Note was due and payable in full on the first day 
of September, 1 983. 
5. Plaintiffs fully performed under the contract except to 
provide a deed to the property and that had not been provided 
because Defendants had failed to deliver a note and Trust Deed as 
required under the contract. In April of 1984, Plaintiffs, 
Kendrick and Lila McCracken, deeded individually and as Trustees 
all their interest in the subject real property of this action to 
Plaintiff Mark Cecil McCracken. 
6. On September 1, 1983, the remaining outstanding balance 
due under the contract was $149,500.00 which sum has not since 
been paid by the Defendants. The court having made the following 
findings of fact makes the following conclusions of law: 
f "• *• 7 
1. The contract entered into between the parties on or 
about O^tober 19, 1978, is binding upon the parties and 
enforceable, 
2. The balance due under the contract as of September 1, 
1983, is $149,500.00. 
3. Any possible defect in title or the ability of 
Plaintiff, Mark Cecil McCracken to convey title in a condition as 
required under the contract, particularly because of defective 
powers of attorney was cured by the executioti, delivery and 
recording of that certain Special Warranty Deed dated April 23, 
1984, from Kendrick and Lila McCracken to Mark Cecil McCracken. 
4. Jerry Downs and Gerald Greaves are liable and obligated 
to execute and deliver a Promissory Note in the principal amount 
of $179,500.00 dated October 19, 1978, payable to Mark McCracken 
and due and payable on the first day of September, 1983, and to 
execute and deliver a Deed of Trust securing the payment of said 
note and pledging the subject real property bf this action for 
that purpose and granting a right of deficiency in the event of 
foreclosure should the sale of the property fail to pay all sums 
due on an after September 1, 1983. 
5. An order of this court should be entered compelling 
Defendants Jerry Downs and Gerald Greaves to execute a Promissory 
Note and Deed of Trust in accordance with th^ provisions of the 
foregoing conclusion of law, and finding that the balance due 
u, f i l - . i S 
under said note as of September 1, 1983, was $149,500.00 and that 
Plaintiffs are entitled to exercise all rights and remedies of 
foreclosure and collection of deficiency. 
DATED this \1^ day of 11 fv-Gyv.^ 6 ien> 1985. 
Distri/ct \Jud 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was hand delivered to George Preston, attorney for 
Defendant, at 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah this o^-?/ ~ day of 
dyhbejT . 1985. 
^ ^ / 
()i :>.: ( j 
James C. Jenkins 
JAMES C. JENKINS & ASSOCIATES 
67 East 100 North 
P.O. Box 3700 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-4107 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, pOUNTY OF CACHE 
MARK MCCRACKEN, KENDRICK 
MCCRACKEN, LILA P. MCCRACKEN 
and DORIS E. McCRACKEN 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JERRY DOWNS and JERALD 
GREAVES 
Defendant 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No^ 22759 
This matter having come on regularly before the Court after 
trial and the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now therefore, 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES as follbws: 
1. Defendant Jerry Downs and Jerald Greaves are hereby 
ordered to execute forthwith a Note and Deid of Trust in the form 
and upon the terms set forth in the attached Exhibit "A" and MB,! 
and deliver the same to James C. Jenkins, attorney for 
Plaintiffs, 
2. The remaining outstanding balance [due under said 
Promissory Note as of September 1, 1983, is the sum of 
$149,500.00. 
3. Plaintiffs are and shall be entitled to exercise and 
enforce all rights and remedies provided under said Note and Deed 
of Trust to include rights of foreclosure n^d recovery of any 
resulting deficiencies, judicially or non-jjudicially. 
'D9 '?S 
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4. Plaintiffs upon delivery of said executed note and Deed 
of Trust shall cause to be recorded a Warranty Deed conveying the 
subject property to Defendants and concurrently therewith the 
Trust Deed pledging said property as security for the payment of 
said Note. Said Warranty Deed shall be in the form and upon the 
terms and conditions set forth in the attached Exhibit "C" and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
5. In addition to the foregoing Plaintiffs are awarded 
their costs of Court. The parties shall bear their own attorneys 
fees and other costs. 
DATED this J7- day of H I K ^ W U ^ , 1985. 
• i / 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was hand delivered to George Preston at 31 Federal Avenue, 
Logan, Utah, this ^gj~* day of (Ocboke.f~> 1985. 
C7) 
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